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Abstract
We study the problem of sharing the revenue from broadcasting sport events, among
participating players. We provide direct, axiomatic and game-theoretical foundations for
two focal rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. The former allocates the
revenues generated from broadcasting each game equally among the participating players
in the game. The latter concedes players in each game the revenues generated by their
respective fans and divides equally the residual. We also provide an application studying
the case of sharing the revenue from broadcasting games in La Liga, the Spanish Football
League. We show that hybrid schemes, combining our rules with lower bounds and per-
formance measures, yield close outcomes to the current allocation being implemented by
the Spanish National Professional Football League Association.
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1 Introduction
For most sports organizations, the sale of broadcasting and media rights is now the biggest
source of revenue. A study of how much money various professional sports leagues generates
shows that the NFL made $13 billion in revenue last season.1 The Major League Baseball,
came second with $9:5 billion and the Premier League third with $5:3 billion.2 Sharing these
sizable revenues among participating teams is, by no means, a straightforward problem. Rules
vary across the world. For instance, FC Barcelona and Real Madrid CF, the two Spanish giant
football clubs, used to earn each more than 20% of the revenues generated by the Spanish
football league. In England, however, the top two teams combined only make 13% of the
revenues generated by the Premier League.3
The aim of this paper is to provide a formal model to study the problem of sharing the
revenues from broadcasting sport events. Our model could be applied to di¤erent forms of
competitions, but our running example will be the format of most European football leagues.
That is, a round robin tournament in which each competitor (team) plays in turn against every
other (home and away). Thus, the input of our model will be a (square) matrix in which each
entry will be indicating the revenues associated to broadcasting the game between the two
corresponding competitors. For ease of exposition, we shall assume an equal pay per view fee
to each game. Thus, broadcasting revenues can be normalized to audiences.
We shall take several approaches to analyze this problem. Two rules will be salient from our
analysis. On the one hand, what we shall call the equal-split rule, which allocates the revenues
from each game equally among the two playing teams, and aggregates across games. On the
other hand, what we shall call concede-and-divide, which concedes each team the audience from
its fan base and divides equally the residual. As we shall elaborate later, both rules convey
somewhat polar forms of estimating the fan e¤ect.
More precisely, we rst take a direct approach and suppose that the audience of each game
1The study Which Professional Sports Leagues Make the Most Money is published by Howmuch.net, a
cost information website. It can be accessed at https://howmuch.net/articles/sports-leagues-by-revenue.
2Four of the top ve leagues in revenue are in North America. However, 14 of the 20 biggest earners are
football leagues that are mostly based in Europe.
3This might partly explain why in the last 13 editions of the Spanish Football League only once the champion
was di¤erent from FC Barcelona and Real Madrid CF, whereas the Premier League witnessed 4 di¤erent
champions in its last 5 editions.
3
involving two teams is divided in four (disjoint) groups; namely, the generic fans of the sport
being played (who watch the game, independently of the involved teams), the fans of each team
(who watch the game, independently of the opponent), and the joint fans of both teams (who
watch the game, because those actual two teams play). We then consider two focal scenarios
for what we call the fan e¤ect. The minimalist scenario assumes that no team has independent
fans and that, therefore, the audience of each game should be equally attributed to both teams.
This gives rise to the equal-split rule. The maximalist scenario assumes that teams have as
many fans as possible (minimizing the number of joint fans) and, therefore, each team should
be attributed the audience associated to its fan base. If generic fans of the sport being played
also exist, they should be split equally, among all teams. In other words, each team concedes
the other the audience attributed to its fan base, and the remainder audience is divided equally.
This gives rise to concede-and-divide.
In the minimalist scenario for the fan e¤ect described above, we also take a game-theoretical
approach in which we deal with a natural cooperative game associated to the problem. It turns
out that the Shapley value of such a game will always yield the same solutions as the equal-split
rule for the original problem. Due to the properties of the game, the Shapley value also coincides
with two other well-known values (the Nucleolus and the  -value), and it is guaranteed to be a
selection of the core, which implies that the equal-split rule satises the standard participation
constraints. In other words, the allocations provided by the equal-split rule are secession-proof,
as teams do not have incentives to secede from the initial organization and create their own
(sub)tournament.
In this (minimalist) scenario we also take another indirect approach in which we focus
on an associated problem of adjudicating conicting claims to the original problem. Here we
observe that two of the best-known rules to adjudicate conicting claims (the proportional and
Talmud rules), which can be traced back to Aristotle and the Talmud (e.g., Moreno-Ternero
and Thomson, 2017) coincide with our equal-split rule in their recommendations. The other
two most well-known rules to adjudicate conicting claims (the constrained equal-awards and
constrained equal-losses rules) do not always guarantee secession-proof allocations.
As for themaximalist scenario for the fan e¤ect, we derive concede-and-divide as an intuitive
procedure of sharing audiences, partly based on a linear regression model. More precisely,
if we assume the audience of a game is disentangled in four numbers, referring to the four
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groups mentioned above, and aim to minimize the fourth (referring to the joint fans of both
teams), then the problem would be equivalent to deriving the OLS estimator of a suitable linear
regression model (after dealing with a problem of colinearity). We show that if we compute
the OLS estimations for each of the four numbers in which an audience disentangles, the rule
constructed imposing the concession of each fan base to each corresponding team, and the equal
division of the remaining audience, happens to coincide with concede-and-divide.
Finally, we take an axiomatic approach to the problem formalizing axioms that reect ethical
or operational principles with normative appeal. It turns out that the two rules mentioned above
are characterized by three properties. Two properties are common in both characterizations.
Namely, equal treatment of equals, which states that if two competitors have the same audiences,
then they should receive the same amount, and additivity, which states that revenues should
be additive on the audience matrix.4 The third property in each characterization result comes
from a pair of somewhat polar properties modeling the e¤ect of null or nullifying players,
respectively. More precisely, the null player property says that if nobody watches a single
game of a given team (i.e., the team has a null audience), then such a team gets no revenue.
On the other hand, the nullifying player property says that if a team nullies the audience
of all the games it plays with respect to a previous tournament involving the same teams (for
instance, due to some kind of boycott), then the allocation of such a team should decrease
exactly by the total audience of such a team in the previous tournament.5
We conclude our analysis with an empirical application focussing on La Liga, the Spanish
Football League, a tournament tting our model. We provide the schemes that our two rules
would yield for the available data from that tournament. They provide reasonable (lower and
upper) bounds for the amounts teams should obtain. We nd that hybrid schemes, in which
our rules are only used to share one fourth of the budget, whereas another fourth is allocated
according to performance, and the rest half is equally split, yield close outcomes to the current
allocation being implemented by the Spanish National Professional Football League.
4An interpretation is that the aggregation of the revenue sharing in two seasons (involving the same com-
petitors) is equivalent to the revenue sharing in the hypothetical combined season aggregating the audiences of
the corresponding games (involving the same teams) in both seasons.
5It turns out that, as we shall show later, additivity is implied by the nullifying player property, when
combined with equal treatment of equals, and, thus, it is not required in the characterization of concede-and-
divide.
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Our work is related to several research elds, as described next.
First, it is obviously connected to the literature on sport economics. In his pioneering work
within that literature, Rottenberg (1956) argued that, under the prot-maximizing assumption,
revenue sharing among (sport) clubs does not a¤ect the distribution of playing talent.6 This was
later contested in more general models (e.g., Atkinson et al., 1988; Késenne, 2000). In any case,
the distribution of playing talent determines the competitive balance of a sports competition
and, therefore, its value (e.g., Hansen and Tvede, 2016). We are not concerned in this paper
with the process of transforming revenues into playing talent that each team undertakes. Our
aim, instead, is to explore appealing rules (from a normative, as well as from an empirical and
game-theoretical viewpoint) to share the revenues that are collectively obtained upon selling
broadcasting rights. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been addressed in the literature
on sport economics yet.
Second, our work also relates to the industrial organization literature dealing with bundling.
It has long been known that bundling products may increase revenue with respect to selling
products independently (e.g., Adams and Yellen, 1976). Industries traditionally engaged in the
practice include telecommunications, nancial services, health care, and information. Trans-
portation cards combining access to all the transportation means (e.g., bus, subway, tram) in
a given city, or cultural cards doing the same for cultural venues (e.g., museums, attractions)
are also frequent cases (e.g., Ginsburgh and Zang, 2003; Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero,
2015). In our hyper-connected world, within the era of internet, new bundling strategies are
emerging. Focal instances are unlimited streaming video or music downloads through periodic
charges from digital video merchants or music sellers (e.g., iTunes, Netix). There exist com-
plex relationships between the independent price (pay per view/listening) of each product and
the bundled price. Consequently, the problem of sharing the revenue from periodic charges to
unlimited streaming among the participating agents (authors, artists, etc.) is a complex one.
Nevertheless, it shares many features with the problem we analyze in this paper. Thus, we
believe our results could shed light on that problem too.
Third, our work is connected to the axiomatic literature on resource allocation. In the
last forty years, a variety of formal criteria of fair allocation have been introduced in economic
theory (e.g., Thomson, 2014). These criteria have broad conceptual appeal, as well as signicant
6See also El Hodiri and Quirk (1971).
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operational power, and have contributed considerably to our understanding of normative issues
concerning the allocation of goods and services. The pioneering criterion was no-envy (e.g.,
Foley, 1967), which simply says that no agent should prefer someone elses assignment to his
own. Other criteria formalizing ethical principles such as impartiality, priority, or solidarity
have also played an important role in deriving fair allocation rules (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and
Roemer, 2006, 2012).
Fourth, our paper is related to the literature on cooperative game theory. There is a tradition
of analyzing problems involving agentscooperation with a game-theoretical approach. Classical
instances are the so-called airport problems (e.g., Littlechild and Owen, 1973), in which the cost
of a runway has to be shared among di¤erent types of airplanes, bankruptcy problems from the
Talmud (Aumann and Maschler, 1985), or telecommunications problems such as the Terrestrial
Flight Telephone System (in short, TFTS) and the rerouting of international telephone calls
(e.g., van den Nouweland et al., 1996). One of the approaches we take in this paper is precisely
this one. The game we associate to our problems is formally equivalent to the game associated
by van den Nouweland et al., (1996) to the TFTS situations they study. This implies that
several traditional values (Shapley, Nucleolus and  -value) coincide for the game, and that
they are core selections, thus guaranteeing that the participation constraints are satised. As
we shall argue later, this constitutes a strong argument in favor of the equal-split rule (which
coincides with the mentioned three values in this case).
To conclude, we mention that, in a certain sense, we can interpret a game between two teams
as a joint venture with which they generate (collective) revenues. As such, the fan e¤ect could
be interpreted as a measure of each teams contribution to this joint venture. Flores-Szwagrzak
and Treibich (2017) have recently introduced (and characterized) an innovative productivity
index, dubbed CoScore, that disentangles individual from collaborative productivity. It is a
one-parameter family capturing the endogenous relationship between individual productivity
and credit allocation in the presence of teamwork. For the lowest value of the parameter, credit
is allocated proportionally to each team members endogenous score. As the value increases, the
allocation becomes more egalitarian (with credit being allocated equally at the highest value).
Although they apply it to formally account for coauthorship in quantifying individual scientic
productivity, and to the productivity of NBA players, it is potentially applicable for our setting
too, as a sort of endogenous compromise between our two polar rules.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section
3, we deal with the minimalist scenario for the fan e¤ect, and two indirect approaches, which
all drive towards the equal-split rule. More precisely, we take in this section a game-theoretical
approach, associating a suitable cooperative game to each problem, which constitutes an en-
dorsement for the equal-split rule. We also associate our problems to problems of adjudicating
conicting claims and appeal to focal rules in the literature dealing with these latter problems
to solve the former. In Section 4, we deal with the maximalist scenario for the fan e¤ect, which
drives towards concede-and-divide. In Section 5, we present the axiomatic analysis, which sup-
ports both rules. In Section 6, we provide an empirical application to the Spanish Football
League. We conclude in Section 7.
2 The model
Let N represent the set of all potential competitors (teams) and let N be the family of all nite
(non-empty) subsets of N. An element N 2 N describes a nite set of teams. Its cardinality
is denoted by n. We assume n  3.7 Given N 2 N , let N denote the set of all orders on N .
Given  2 N , let Pre (i; ) denote the set of elements of N which come before i in the order
given by , i.e., Pre (i; ) = fj 2 N j  (j) <  (i)g.
For each pair of teams i; j 2 N , we denote by aij the broadcasting audience (number of
viewers) for the game played by i and j at is stadium. We use the notational convention
that aii = 0, for each i 2 N . Let A = (aij)(i;j)2NN denote the resulting matrix with the
broadcasting audiences generated in the whole tournament involving the teams within N .8 Let
Ann denote the set of all possible such matrices, and A =
S
nAnn.
For each A 2 A, let jjAjj denote the total audience of the tournament. Namely,
jjAjj =
X
i;j2N
aij:
7All of our results hold under this assumption, and some of them hold too when n = 2.
8We are therefore assuming a standard round robin tournament, i.e., a league in which each team plays each
other team twice: once home, another away. This is the usual format, for instance, of the main European football
leagues. Our model could also be extended to encompass other formats such as those in which some teams play
other teams a di¤erent number of times, or even include play-o¤s at the end of the regular season, which is the
case of most of North American professional sports. In such a case, aij would denote the broadcasting audience
in all games played by i and j at is stadium.
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A (broadcasting sports) problem is a duplet (N;A), where N 2 N is the set of teams and
A = (aij)(i;j)2NN 2 Ann is the audience matrix. The family of all the problems described
as such is denoted by P. When no confusion arises, we write A instead of (N;A) :
For each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N , let i(N;A) denote the total audience achieved by
team i, i.e.,
i(N;A) =
X
j2N
(aij + aji):
When no confusion arises, we write i instead of i (N;A). Notice that, for each problem
(N;A) 2 P, Pi2N i(N;A) = 2jjAjj:
Consider the following example, to which we will after refer.
Example 1 Let (N;A) 2 P be such that N = f1; 2; 3g and
A =
0BBB@
0 1200 1030
1200 0 230
1030 230 0
1CCCA
Then, jjAjj = 4920 and (N;A) = (1(N;A); 2(N;A); 3(N;A)) = (4460; 2860; 2520) :
A (sharing) rule is a mapping that associates with each problem an allocation indicating
the amount each team gets from the total revenue generated by broadcasting games. Without
loss of generality, we normalize the revenue generated from each viewer to 1 (to be interpreted
as the pay per viewfee). Thus, formally, R : P ! Rn is such that, for each (N;A) 2 P,X
i2N
Ri (N;A) = jjAjj:
An obvious example of rule is the one that simply divides the total audience equally among
the teams. This rule ignores di¤erences between teams and, thus, we shall discard it. The next
two, which will be the main focus of this work, do not. They share a common ground as they
take as starting point each teams total audience (i). They both subtract from it an amount
associated to each of the remaining n   1 teams. For the rst rule, an equal share of half of
the teams total audience (i). For the second rule, the average audience per game that the
remaining teams yield in the remaining games they play (i). Formally,
Equal-split rule, ES: for each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
ESi (N;A) = i   (n  1)i =
i
2
=
P
j2N(aij + aji)
2
:
9
Concede-and-divide, CD: for each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
CDi (N;A) = i   (n  1)i = i  
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk + akj)
n  2 :
The equal-split rule therefore splits equally the audience of each game. Alternatively, one
could say that it divides the total audience proportionally to the vector of audiences of the
teams. In that sense, the rule is endorsing one of the most widely accepted principles of
distributive justice (namely, proportionality), which can be traced back to Aristotle.9
Concede-and-divide, on the other hand, compares the performance of a team with the
average performance of the other teams.10 It turns out that it is equivalent to a specic linear
combination of the equal-split rule and the rule that divides the total audience equally among
the teams. Namely, for each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
CDi (N;A) =
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2 =
2 (n  1)
n  2 ESi (N;A) 
n
n  2
jjAjj
n
:
In Example 1 we have that
Rule/Team 1 2 3
Equal-Split 2230 1430 1260
Concede-and-Divide 4000 800 120
The equal-split rule ignores the existence of team fans. It splits the audience of each game
equally among the two participating teams. Now, suppose a given game between teams i and
j is watched (via broadcasting) by, say, 200 people. Given our normalizing assumption, this
means the game generates a revenue of 200. Imagine now we have the following additional
information: 20 individuals watched the game simply because they like the sport (and might
have watched any game); 100 individuals watched the game because they are fans of team i,
whereas 30 individuals watched the game because they are fans of team j. Finally, the remaining
50 individuals watched the game because they considered that particular game between teams
i and j was appealing. The equal-split rule would propose awarding 100 to each team, thus
ignoring the unequal number of fans of the two teams. An alternative allocation, taking into
account this latter aspect, would concede each team the amount generated by its fans (100 for
9The reader is referred to Section 3.2 where we elaborate further on this point.
10A plausible reason to name this rule as such will be given later in this section.
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team i, 30 for team j) and would divide the rest equally. That is, team i would receive 135
whereas team j would receive 65. As we shall see next, concede-and-divide, which can be traced
back to the Talmud, paves the way for the rule we dened above under the same name.11
The fan e¤ect described above is relevant. It might actually explain (at least, partially)
why audiences di¤er so much. Some teams have more fans than others and, consequently, they
generate larger audiences. This aspect seems to be indeed taken into account by the actual
revenue sharing rules used in professional sports, where the amount assigned to each team
depends on some parameters that try to capture such di¤erences.
We can safely argue that, in general, one might become a viewer of a game involving teams
i and j for several reasons:
1. Being a fan of this sport per se (in which case one would be eager to watch all the games,
independently of the teams playing).
2. Being a fan of team i (in which case one would be eager to watch all the games involving
team i).
3. Being a fan of team j (in which case one would be eager to watch all the games involving
team j).
4. Considering that the game between teams i and j is interesting.
In practice, the above information is not available and we only know the total audience of
the game. Let us, for instance, revisit Example 1. Therein, we can conjecture several plausible
hypothesis (in terms of items 1 to 4 described above) for the provided audiences.
Hypothesis (a). All viewers belong to group 4 and, thus, no team has fans. In this case,
the procedure described above (conceding each game its fan base and dividing equally the
remainder) would recommend awarding team 1
1200
2
+
1030
2
+
1200
2
+
1030
2
= 2230:
The allocation would be
(2230; 1430; 1260) ;
11The term was coined by Thomson (2003) to illustrate the solution to the so-called contested-garment
problem appearing in the Talmud.
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which is the allocation proposed by the equal-split rule.
Hypothesis (b). Team 1 has 1000 fans, team 2 has 200 fans and team 3 has 30 fans. No
viewers belong to groups 1 or 4. In this case, the procedure described above would recommend
awarding 4000 to team 1 (it plays 4 games with 1000 fans in each). The allocation would be
(4000; 800; 120) ;
which is the allocation proposed by concede-and-divide.
Hypothesis (c). Team 1 has 800 fans, team 2 has 100 fans and team 3 has 30 fans. 90
viewers belong to group 1. The remaining viewers belong to group 4. That is,
Totals Group 1 Fans 1 Fans 2 Fans 3 Group 4
1200 90 800 100 210
1030 90 800 30 110
230 90 100 30 10
In this case, the procedure described above would recommend the allocation
(3700; 800; 420) ;
which is somewhat in between the other two allocations described above.
The rst two hypothesis described above can be thought of as the extreme scenarios regard-
ing the fan e¤ect. They can be generalized as follows:
In the rst (minimalist) scenario, it is assumed that there are no fans. Thus, it seems natural
to divide aij equally between teams i and j, for each i; j 2 N . This is what the equal-split rule
recommends.
In the second (maximalist) scenario, we assume there exist as many fans as possible, com-
patible with the data. We do so by minimizing the number of viewers in group 4. As we shall
see later, this is what concede-and-divide recommends.
The two rules therefore provide polar estimates of the fan e¤ect. Based on this, we argue
that they should provide a range in which allocations estimating the fan e¤ect should lie.
For instance, in Example 1, team 1 should receive something between 2230 and 4000, team 2
between 800 and 1430 and team 3 between 120 and 1260.
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3 The minimalist scenario for the fan e¤ect and the
equal-split rule
In this section we consider the lower bound for the fan e¤ect. In the parlance used above, we
assume that all viewers belong to group 4 and, therefore, that teams have no fans. This means
that a person decides to watch a game only because of the pair of teams playing the game.
In this scenario, and as argued above, it seems natural to consider the equal-split rule. We
analyze it here in detail. In the rst subsection, we associate to each problem a cooperative
game with transferable utility. We prove that the Shapley value of the game coincides with the
equal-split rule. The core is non empty and the equal-split rule belongs to the core, and this
is noteworthy because the Shapley value is not always in the core. In the second subsection,
we associate to each problem a claims problem. We prove that the so-called proportional and
Talmud rules for claims problems coincide with the equal-split rule.
3.1 The (cooperative) game-theoretical approach
A cooperative game with transferable utility, briey a TU game, is a pair (N; v), where
N denotes a set of agents and v : 2N ! R satises v (?) = 0: We say that (N; v) is convex if,
for each pair S; T  N and i 2 N such that S  T and i =2 T;
v (T [ fig)  v (T )  v (S [ fig)  v (S) :
We present some well-known solutions for TU games. First, the core, dened as the set of
feasible payo¤ vectors, upon which no coalition can improve. Formally,
C (N; v) =
(
x 2 RN such that
X
i2N
xi = v (N) and
X
i2S
xi  v (S) , for each S  N
)
:
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is dened for each player as the average of his contri-
butions across orders of agents. Formally, for each i 2 N ,
Shi (N; v) =
1
n!
X
2N
[v (Pre (i; ) [ fig)  v (Pre (i; ))] :
We associate with each (broadcasting sports) problem (N;A) 2 P a TU game (N; vA)
where, for each S  N; vA (S) denotes the total audience of the games played by the teams in
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S. Namely,
vA (S) =
X
i;j2S
i6=j
aij =
X
i;j2S
i<j
(aij + aji) :
Notice that, for each problem (N;A) 2 P and each i 2 N; vA (fig) = 0:
In Example 1,
S f1; 2g f1; 3g f2; 3g f1; 2; 3g
vA (S) 2400 2060 460 4920
and
Sh (N; vA) = (2230; 1430; 1260) = ES (N;A) :
The next result establishes a correspondence between the equal-split rule and the Shapley
value for the TU-game described above.
Theorem 1 For each (N;A) 2 P, ES (N;A) = Sh (N; vA).
Proof. Let (N;A) 2 P and (N; vA) be its associated TU game. For each pair i; j 2 N with
i 6= j we dene the function vijA as follows. For each S  N ,
vijA (S) =
8<: aij + aji if fi; jg  S0 otherwise.
Consider the resulting TU-game
 
N; vijA

. It is straightforward to see that, for such a game,
agents i and j are symmetric, whereas the remaining agents in Nn fi; jg are null. Thus,
Shk
 
N; vijA

=
8<:
aij+aji
2
if k 2 fi; jg
0 otherwise.
For each S  N;
vA (S) =
X
i;j2S
i<j
(aij + aji) =
X
i;j2N
i<j
vijA (S) :
As the Shapley value is additive on v; we have that
Sh (N; vA) =
X
i;j2N
i<j
Sh
 
N; vijA

:
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Thus, for each k 2 N;
Shk (N; vA) =
X
i;j2N
i<j
Shk
 
N; vijA

=
X
j2N
Shk

N; vkjA

=
X
j2N
akj + ajk
2
=
k
2
:
The game we have described in this section is formally equivalent to the game associated by
van den Nouweland et al., (1996) to the so-called Terrestial Flight Telephone System (in short,
TFTS) situations they formalize.12 They prove that such a game is convex and, therefore, its
Shapley value belongs to the core (e.g., Shapley, 1953). Thus, it follows from Theorem 1 that
the equal-split rule always yields secession-proof allocations. Formally, ES (N;A) 2 C (N; vA),
for each problem (N;A).
The next result fully characterizes the core of this game.
Proposition 1 Let (N;A) 2 P and (N; vA) be its associated TU game. Then, x = (xi)i2N 2
C (N; vA) if and only if, for each i 2 N; there exist
 
xji

j2Nnfig satisfying three conditions:
(i) xji  0, for each j 2 Nn fig;
(ii)
P
j2Nnfig
xji = xi;
(iii) xji + x
i
j = aij + aji, for each j 2 Nn fig;
Proof. We rst prove that if x = (xi)i2N is such that, for each i 2 N; there exists
 
xji

j2Nnfig
satisfying the three conditions, then x 2 C (N; vA).
By (ii), X
i2N
xi =
X
i2N
X
j2Nnfig
xji =
X
i;j2N
i<j
 
xji + x
i
j

:
By (iii), X
i;j2N
i<j
 
xji + x
i
j

=
X
i;j2N
i<j
(aij + aji) = vA (N) :
Analogously, for each S  N;X
i2S
xi =
X
i2S
X
j2Nnfig
xji 
X
i2S
X
j2Snfig
xji =
X
i;j2S
i<j
 
xji + x
i
j

=
X
i;j2S
i<j
(aij + aji) = vA (S) :
12A Terrestrial Flight Telephone System refers to an agreement made by a group of countries in order to
provide a network of ground stations so that phone calls can be made within their airplanes while ying above
their territory.
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Then, x 2 C (N; vA).
Conversely, let x = (xi)i2N 2 C (N; vA). As (N; vA) is convex, the core is the convex hull of
the vectors corresponding to the various actions in the player set. Thus, there exists (y)2N
with y  0 for each  2 N and
P
2N
y = 1 such that, for each i 2 N;
xi =
X
2N
y [vA (Pre (i; ) [ fig)  vA (Pre (i; ))] :
Because of the denition of vA, we have that
xi =
X
2N
y
24 X
j2Pre(i;)
(aij + aji)
35 = X
j2Nnfig
(aij + aji)
X
2N ;j2Pre(i;)
y:
For each pair i; j 2 N , with i 6= j, we dene
xji = (aij + aji)
X
2N ;j2Pre(i;)
y:
Thus, xji  0, for each j 2 Nn fig, and for each i 2 N , i.e., (i) holds.
Furthermore,
P
j2Nnfig
xji = xi, i.e., (ii) holds.
Let i; j 2 N with i 6= j: Then,
xji + x
i
j =
0@(aij + aji) X
2N ;j2Pre(i;)
y
1A+
0@(aij + aji) X
2N ;i2Pre(j;)
y
1A
= (aij + aji)
X
2N
y = aij + aji;
i.e., (iii) holds.
The above proposition states that, in order to satisfy the core constraints, we should divide
the revenue generated by the audience of a game between the two teams playing the game.
There is complete freedom within those bounds. For instance, assigning all the revenue to
one of the teams is admissible. The equal-split rule states that the revenue generated by the
audience of a game be divided equally between the two teams playing the game. Thus, the
allocations that the equal-split rule yields satisfy the core constraints, as mentioned above.
This is a strong argument in favor of the equal-split rule. Teams are corporations and, as
such, any subgroup of teams could potentially secede and form another (smaller) competition.
Thus, if the rule selects allocations within the core, it provides stable outcomes. As shown
above, in this case, the core is non-empty and very large. Thus, it seems reasonable to select
one allocation within the core.
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3.2 The conicting claims approach
ONeill (1982) is credited for introducing one of the simplest (and yet useful) models to study
distributive justice. The so-called problem of adjudicating conicting claims refers to a situation
in which an amount of a perfectly divisible good (the endowment) has to be allocated among
a group of agents who hold claims against it, and the aggregate claim is higher than the
endowment. This basic framework is exible enough to accommodate a variety of related
situations that trace back to ancient sources such as Aristotles essays and the Talmud.13 It
turns out that, as we show in this section, our problems could also be seen as a specic instance
of the problem of adjudicating conicting claims.
Formally, a problem of adjudicating conicting claims (or, simply, a claims problem) is a
triple consisting of a population N 2 N , a claims prole c 2 Rn+, and an endowment E 2 R+
such that
P
i2N ci  E. Let C 
P
i2N ci. To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume
C > 0. Let DN be the domain of claims problems with population N and D  SN2N DN .
Given a problem (N; c; E) 2 DN , an allocation is a vector x 2 Rn satisfying the following
two conditions: (i) for each i 2 N , 0  xi  ci and (ii)
P
i2N xi = E. We refer to (i) as
boundedness and (ii) as balance. A rule on D, R : D ! SN2N Rn, associates with each problem
(N; c; E) 2 D an allocation R (N; c; E) for the problem.
The constrained equal-awards rule, CEA, selects, for each (N; c; E) 2 D, the vector (minfci; g)i2N ,
where  > 0 is chosen so that
P
i2N minfci; g = E.
The constrained equal-losses rule, CEL, selects, for each (N; c; E) 2 D, the vector (maxf0; ci 
g)i2N , where  > 0 is chosen so that
P
i2N maxf0; ci   g = E.
The Talmud rule is a hybrid of the above two. Precisely, for each (N; c; E) 2 D, it selects
T (N; c; E) =
8<: CEA(N; 12c; E) if E  12C1
2
c+ CEL(N; 1
2
c; E   1
2
C) if E  1
2
C
Finally, the proportional rule, P , yields awards proportionally to claims, i.e., for each
(N; c; E) 2 D, P (N; c; E) = E
C
 c.
In a (broadcasting sports) problem (N;A) 2 P, as formalized above, the issue is to allocate
the aggregate audience in the tournament (jjAjj) among the participating teams (N). If we
13The reader is referred to Thomson (2003, 2015, 2017) for excellent surveys of the sizable literature dealing
with this model.
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assume that each team claims the entire audience of the games it played (i (N;A)), then
we obviously have a problem of adjudicating conicting claims. Formally, we associate with
each (broadcasting sports) problem (N;A) 2 P a claims problem  N; cA; EA 2 D where
cAi = i (N;A), for each i 2 N , and EA = jjAjj.
In Example 1 we have E = 4920 and
i 1 2 3
cAi 4460 2860 2520
Pi
 
N; cA; EA

2230 1430 1260
CEAi
 
N; cA; EA

1640 1640 1640
CELi
 
N; cA; EA

2820 1220 880
Ti
 
N; cA; EA

2230 1430 1260
The next result summarizes our ndings in this section. The Talmud rule coincides with the
proportional rule and the equal-split rule. The CEA rule and the CEL rule do not guarantee
allocations within the core. It also states the stability properties of the above rules. It turns
out that, of our four rules, only the proportional rule (or the Talmud rule, as they both coincide
in this setting) guarantees allocations within the core. This is because, as mentioned above,
the proportional rule yields the same outcomes as the equal-split rule.
Proposition 2 The following statements hold:
(a) For each (N;A) 2 P, P  N; cA; EA = T  N; cA; EA = ES (N;A) 2 C (N; vA).
(b) There exists (N;A) 2 P such that CEA  N; cA; EA =2 C (N; vA).
(c) There exists (N;A) 2 P such that CEL  N; cA; EA =2 C (N; vA).
Proof. (a) For each (N;A) 2 P, EA =
P
i2N c
A
i
2
. Thus,
P
 
N; cA; EA

= T
 
N; cA; EA

=
c
2
= ES (N;A) 2 C (N; vA) :
(b) Let (N;A) 2 P be such that N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and
A =
0BBBBBB@
0 3 0 0
3 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1CCCCCCA
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Then, EA = 8, cA = (6; 6; 2; 2). Thus, CEA
 
N; cA; EA

= (2; 2; 2; 2). As
CEA1
 
N; cA; EA

+ CEA2
 
N; cA; EA

= 4 < 6 = a12 + a21;
it follows from Proposition 1 (b) that CEA
 
N; cA; EA

=2 C (N; vA).
(c) Let (N;A) 2 P be such that N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and
A =
0BBBBBB@
0 9 0 0
9 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1CCCCCCA
Then, EA = 20, cA = (18; 18; 2; 2) and CEL
 
N; cA; EA

= (10; 10; 0; 0). As
CEL3
 
N; cA; EA

+ CEL4
 
N; cA; EA

= 0 < 2 = a34 + a43;
it follows from Proposition 1 (b) that CEL
 
N; cA; EA

=2 C (N; vA)
4 The maximalist scenario for the fan e¤ect and concede-
and-divide
In this section we consider the opposite scenario to that analyzed in the previous section. More
precisely, we consider the maximalist scenario for the fan e¤ect and assume that when somebody
decides to watch a game, it is because he/she is a fan of one of the teams or because he/she is
a fan of the specic sport being considered. In other words, nobody belongs to group 4, i.e.,
nobody is a joint fan of both teams in a game. In this scenario, we believe each team should
receive the revenues generated by its fans, whereas the revenue coming from the generic sport
fans should be divided equally among all teams. We may argue that this maximalist scenario
is extreme and also that the minimalist scenario analyzed in the previous section was extreme
in the opposite way. It will be nevertheless interesting to understand the two polar cases as
they will represent meaningful lower and upper bounds for the amounts teams should get.
Formally, for each pair i; j 2 N; with i 6= j, let
aij = b0 + bi + bj + "ij;
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where b0 denotes the number of generic sport fans, bk denotes the number of fans of team
k = i; j, and "ij denotes the number of joint fans for the pair fi; jg. In this scenario, our aim
is to minimize f"ijgi;j2N (given the audience data).
Thus, we aim to solve
min
b2Rn+1
X
i;j2N;i6=j
"2ij = min
b2Rn+1
X
i;j2N;i6=j
(aij   b0   bi   bj)2 : (1)
Unfortunately, the above problem cannot be solved.14 We then remove one of the teams
k 2 N , and consider the following minimization problem:
min
b2Rn
X
i;j2N;i6=j
"2ij (2)
where
"ij =
8>>><>>>:
aij   b0   bi   bj if k =2 fi; jg
aij   b0   bi if k = j
aij   b0   bj if k = i
Let b^0 and
n
b^i
o
i2Nnfkg
denote the solutions to (2). Besides, for each pair i; j 2 N; with
i 6= j, we denote
"^ij =
8>>><>>>:
aij   b^0   b^i   b^j if k =2 fi; jg
aij   b^0   b^i if k = j
aij   b^0   b^j if k = i
We now impose the following principles to allocate aij:
(P1) b^0 is divided equally among all teams.15
(P2) b^l is assigned to team l, for each l 2 N n fkg.
(P3) "^ij is divided equally between teams i and j, for each pair i; j 2 N; with i 6= j.
14This is due to the fact that the minimization problem (1) coincides with the minimization problem induced
by the OLS estimator associated with the following regression model:
Y = b0 +
X
i2N
biXi + ";
where Y is the audience of a game, Xi is the team dummy variable (i.e., Xi = 1 if team i plays the game and 0
otherwise) and " is the error term. It is straightforward to see that, for each k = 1; :::; n, Xk = 2A 
P
i2NnfkgXi,
where 2A is the vector with all coordinates equal to 2. Thus, the problem involves colinearity.
15If, instead, we assume that it is divided equally between teams i and j, nothing will change.
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Applying those principles we can dene a rule Rb;k where, for each problem (N;A) 2 P and
each i 2 N; the allocation for team i is16
Rb;ki (N;A) =
8<: (n  1) bb0 + 2 (n  1) bbi +
P
j2Nnfig
c"ij+c"ji
2
if i 6= k
(n  1) bb0 +Pj2Nnfig c"ij+c"ji2 if i = k (3)
One might argue that the above allocation would depend on k (the removed team). The
next theorem shows that this is not the case. It actually states that the allocation rule, so
constructed, coincides with concede-and-divide.
Theorem 2 For each (N;A) 2 P and each pair i; k 2 N; let Rb;ki (N;A) be the allocation
obtained by applying formula (3). Then,
Rb;ki (N;A) =
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2 = CDi (N;A) :
Proof. We note rst that the solution to the minimization problem (2) coincides with the OLS
estimator of the linear regression model where the set of dependent variables is fXigi2Nnfkg,
and, thus, no colinearity occurs.
Given the linear regression model V = b0 +
P
i2S biUi + "; it is well known that the OLS
estimator is computed as bbi
i2S
= Cov (U;U) 1Cov (U; V ) and (4)bb0 = V  X
i2S
bbiUi
where
Cov (U;U) = (Cov (Ui; Uj))i;j2S and
Cov (U; V ) = (Cov (Ui; V ))i2S
Besides, given two variables U; V taking the values f(uk; vk)gmk=1we have that
Cov (U; V ) =
mP
k=1
ukvk
m
 
0BB@
mP
k=1
uk
m
1CCA
0BB@
mP
k=1
vk
m
1CCA :
We now apply the previous expressions to our case.
16Note that each team plays 2 (n  1) games.
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1. Let i; j 2 N with i 6= j.
Cov (Xi; Xj) =
2
n (n  1)  

2 (n  1)
n (n  1)

2 (n  1)
n (n  1)

=
2
n (n  1)  
4
n2
=
2 (2  n)
n2 (n  1) :
2. Let i 2 N:
Cov (Xi; Xi) =
2 (n  1)
n (n  1)  

2 (n  1)
n (n  1)

2 (n  1)
n (n  1)

=
2
n
  4
n2
=
2 (n  2)
n2
:
3. Let i 2 N:
Cov (Xi; Y ) =
i
n (n  1)  

2 (n  1)
n (n  1)
 jjAjj
n (n  1)

=
i
n (n  1)  
2 jjAjj
n2 (n  1)
=
ni   2 jjAjj
n2 (n  1) =

i   2 jjAjj
n

1
n (n  1) :
Then Cov (U;U) = Cov (Xi; Xj)i;j2Nnfkg is a matrix of (n  1)  (n  1) dimension: It is
not di¢ cult to show that
Cov (U;U) 1 =
n (n  1)
2 (n  2)
0BBBBBB@
2 1 ::: 1
1 2 ::: 1
1 ::: ::: 1
1 1 1 2
1CCCCCCA (5)
Besides,
Cov (U; V ) =
1
n2 (n  1)
0BBB@
n1   2 jjAjj
:::
nn   2 jjAjj
1CCCA (6)
Because of (4), we have that, for each j 2 Nn fkg,
bbj = n (n  1)
2 (n  2)
1
n2 (n  1)
242 (nj   2 jjAjj) + X
i2Nnfj;kg
(ni   2 jjAjj)
35
=
1
2 (n  2)n
242nj   4 jjAjj+ n X
i2Nnfj;kg
i   2 (n  2) jjAjj
35
=
1
2 (n  2)n
242nj + n X
i2Nnfj;kg
i   2n jjAjj
35 :
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As
P
i2N
i = 2 jjAjj, we have that
bbj = 1
2 (n  2)n [2nj + n (2 jjAjj   (j + k))  2n jjAjj]
=
1
2 (n  2)n [2nj + 2n jjAjj   n (j + k)  2n jjAjj]
=
1
2 (n  2)n [n (j   k)] =
j   k
2 (n  2) :
Furthermore,
bb0 = Y   X
j2Nnfkg
bbjXj = jjAjj
n (n  1)  
X
j2Nnfkg
j   k
2 (n  2)
2 (n  1)
n (n  1)
=
jjAjj
n (n  1)  
X
j2Nnfkg
j   k
n (n  2)
=
jjAjj
n (n  1)  
1
n (n  2)
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j2Nnfkg
j   (n  1)k
35
=
jjAjj
n (n  1)  
1
n (n  2) [2 jjAjj   k   (n  1)k]
=
jjAjj
n (n  1)  
2 jjAjj
n (n  2) +
k
n  2 =  
jjAjj
(n  1) (n  2) +
k
n  2 :
Once we have estimated the parameters we have that
aij = bb0 + bbi + bbj +c"ij if i; j 2 Nn fkg
aik = bb0 + bbi +c"ik if i 2 Nn fkg
aki = bb0 + bbi +c"ki if i 2 Nn fkg :
Given i; j 2 Nn fkg,
c"ij = aij   bb0   bbi   bbj =
= aij +
jjAjj
(n  1) (n  2)  
k
n  2  
i   k
2 (n  2)  
j   k
2 (n  2)
= aij +
jjAjj
(n  1) (n  2)  
i + j
2 (n  2) :
Given i 2 Nn fkg,
c"ik = aik   bb0   bbi =
= aik +
jjAjj
(n  1) (n  2)  
k
n  2  
i   k
2 (n  2)
= aik +
jjAjj
(n  1) (n  2)  
i + k
2 (n  2) :
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Analogously, we have that
c"ki = aki + jjAjj
(n  1) (n  2)  
i + k
2 (n  2) :
Notice that, for each pair i; j 2 N ,
c"ij = aij + jjAjj
(n  1) (n  2)  
i + j
2 (n  2) : (7)
We now compute the rule Rb;ki (N;A) by applying principles (P1), (P2) and (P3) in this
regression. We consider two cases:
 Team i 2 Nn fkg. The audience assigned to team i is made of three components:
By (P1), team i receives
(n  1) bb0 =   jjAjj
n  2 +
(n  1)k
n  2 :
By (P2), team i receives
2 (n  1) bbi = (n  1) (i   k)
n  2 :
By (P3), team i receives
X
j2Nnfig
c"ij +c"ji
2
=
1
2
X
j2Nnfig
(aij + aji) +
jjAjj
(n  2)  
(n  1)i +
P
j2Nnfig j
2 (n  2)
=
i
2
+
jjAjj
n  2  
(n  1)i + 2 jjAjj   i
2 (n  2)
=
i
2
+
jjAjj
(n  2)  
i
2
  jjAjj
n  2 = 0:
Thus, team i receives
Rb;ki (N;A) =  
jjAjj
n  2 +
(n  1)k
n  2 +
(n  1) (i   k)
n  2
=
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2 :
 Team k: The audience assigned to team k is also made of three components:
By (P1), team k receives
(n  1) bb0 =   jjAjj
n  2 +
(n  1)k
n  2 :
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By (P2), team k receives nothing.
Analogously to the previous case, by (P3), team k receives nothing.
Thus, team k receives
RP;kk (N;A) =
(n  1)k   jjAjj
n  2 :
Theorem 2 shows that the rule derived from (3), with the minimization problem (2), is
precisely concede-and-divide, as introduced in Section 2.
5 The axiomatic approach
The previous two sections provided arguments to endorse, respectively, the two focal rules of
this work. First, the equal-split rule was shown to coincide with the Shapley value (as well as
the Nucleolus and the  -value) of a natural convex TU-game, thus guaranteeing stable outcomes
(as formalized by the core of such a game). Second, concede-and-divide arose as the outcome
of an optimization problem aiming to minimize the number of joint fans. In this section, we
provide normative foundations for both rules.
The rst axiom we consider says that if two teams have the same audiences, then they
should receive the same amount.
Equal treatment of equals: For each (N;A) 2 P, and each pair i; j 2 N such that
aik = ajk, and aki = akj, for each k 2 N n fi; jg,
Ri(N;A) = Rj(N;A):
The second axiom says that revenues should be additive on A. Formally,
Additivity: For each pair (N;A) and (N;A0) 2 P
R (N;A+ A0) = R (N;A) +R (N;A0) :
The third axiom says that if nobody watches a single game of a given team (i.e., the team
has a null audience), then such a team gets no revenue.
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Null team: For each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N , such that aij = 0 = aji, for each j 2 N ,
Ri(N;A) = 0:
Alternatively, the next axiom says that if a team nullies the audience of all the games it
plays (for instance, due to some kind of boycott), then the allocation of such a team should
decrease exactly by the total audience of such a team.17 Formally,
Nullifying team: For each (N;A); (N;A0) 2 P such that there exists k 2 N (the nullifying
team) satisfying a0ij = aij when k =2 fi; jg and a0ij = 0 when k 2 fi; jg we have that
Rk(N;A
0) = Rk(N;A)  k(A):
The next result provides the characterizations of the two rules.
Theorem 3 The following statements hold:
(a) A rule satises equal treatment of equals, additivity and null team if and only if it is the
equal-split rule.
(b) A rule satises equal treatment of equals and nullifying team if and only if it is concede-
and-divide.
Proof. (a) It is not di¢ cult to show that the equal-split rule satises the three axioms in the
statement. Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying them. Let (N;A) 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N ,
with i 6= j, let Aij denote the matrix with the following entries:
aijkl =
8<: aij if (k; l) = (i; j)0 otherwise.
Notice that aijji = 0:
Let k 2 N: By additivity,
Rk (N;A) =
X
i;j2N :i6=j
Rk
 
N;Aij

:
By null team, for each pair i; j 2 N with i 6= j, and for each l 2 Nn fi; jg, we have
Rl (N;A
ij) = 0. Thus,
Rk (N;A) =
X
l2Nnfkg

Rk
 
N;Alk

+Rk
 
N;Akl

:
17A similar axiom was introduced in cooperative transferable utility games by van den Brink (2007).
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By equal treatment of equals, Rk
 
N;Alk

= Rl
 
N;Alk

: As
Alk = alk, we have that
Rk
 
N;Alk

= alk
2
: Similarly, Rk
 
N;Akl

= akl
2
: Thus,
Rk (N;A) =
X
l2Nnfkg
halk
2
+
akl
2
i
=
k
2
= Sk (N;A) :
(b) It is not di¢ cult to show that concede-and-divide satises both axioms. Conversely, let R
be a rule satisfying the two axioms in the statement. Let (N;A) 2 P. Let t (A) be the number
of null teams in (N;A) :We proceed recursively on t (A) : Notice that t (A) 2 f0; 1; :::; n  2; ng :
Suppose rst that t (A) = n. Then, A = 0N;N (the matrix with all entries equal to 0): By
equal treatment of equals, for each i 2 N;
Ri (N; 0N;N) = 0 = CDi (N; 0N;N) :
Suppose now that t (A) = n   2. Then, A = Aij + Aji for some i; j 2 N and, therefore,
i (N;A) = j (N;A) = aij + aji, whereas k (N;A) = 0 for each k 2 N n fi; jg. Then,
CDk (N;A) =
8<: aij + aji if k 2 fi; jg (aij+aji)
n 2 otherwise.
As (N;A), (N; 0N;N) ; and k = i are under the hypothesis of nullifying team,
0 = Ri (N; 0N;N) = Ri (N;A)  (aij + aji) :
Thus, Ri (N;A) = aij + aji: Analogously, we can prove that Rj (N;A) = aij + aji:
By equal treatment of equals, we have that Rk (N;Aij) = Rl (N;Aij), for each pair k; l 2
Nn fi; jg. Let x denote such an amount. Then,
aij + aji = jjAjj =
X
k2N
Rk (N;A) = 2 (aij + aji) + (n  2)x;
from where it follows that x =  (aij+aji)
n 2 .
Thus, R (N;A) = CD (N;A), in this case too.
Assume now that R coincides with CD in problems with r null players. We prove that both
rules also coincide when we have r   1 null players.
Let (N;A) 2 P be a problem with r   1 null players. Let k be a no null player in (N;A) :
Let
 
N;A k

be the problem obtained from A by nullifying team k. Namely a kij = aij when
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k =2 fi; jg and a kij = 0 when k 2 fi; jg : As A and A k are under the hypothesis on the axiom
of nullifying team, we deduce that
Rk (N;A) = Rk
 
N;A k

+ k (N;A) and CDk (N;A) = CDk
 
N;A k

+ k (N;A) :
As k is a null player in
 
N;A k

, and (N;A) has r   1 null players,  N;A k has r null
players. As R and CD coincide in problems with r null players, we have that Rk
 
N;A k

=
CDk
 
N;A k

: Thus, Rk (N;A) = CDk (N;A).
Let us denote by D the set of null players in (N;A) : Then,X
i2D
Ri (N;A) = jjAjj  
X
i2NnD
Ri (N;A)
= jjAjj  
X
i2NnD
CDi (N;A)
=
X
i2D
CDi (N;A) :
As R and CD satisfy equal treatment of equals, all null teams in (N;A) must receive the
same according to both rules. Then, for each null player i in (N;A), we have that Ri (N;A) =
CDi (N;A) :
Theorem 4 not only provides a characterization of our two focal rules, but also a common
ground for them. More precisely, it states that both rules are characterized by the combination
of equal treatment of equals, additivity, and a third axiom.18 This di¤erent axiom (null player
in one case; nullifying player in the other case) formalizes the behavior of the rule with respect
to somewhat peculiar teams (those with no viewers in one case; those making viewers vanish
in the other case).
It turns out, nevertheless, that this only di¤erence, reected in the mentioned pair of axioms,
is substantial as the axioms are incompatible. Namely, there is no rule satisfying both the null
team axiom and the nullifying team axiom. Consider the problem (N;A12) dened as in the
proof of Theorem 4, where N = f1; 2; 3g and a12 > 0: If R satises null team we have that
R3 (N;A
12) = 0 and Ri (N; 0N;N) = 0 for each i 2 N: Suppose that R also satises nullifying
team. Using arguments similar to the ones used in the proof of Theorem 4 we can deduce that
R1 (N;A
12) = R2 (N;A
12) = a12: Thus, R3 (N;A12) =  a12, which is a contradiction.
18Actually, additivity is not necessary in the characterization of concede-and-divide, although the rule does
satisfy the axiom.
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6 An empirical application
In this section, we present an empirical application of our model resorting to La Liga, the
Spanish Football League.19
La Liga is a standard round robin tournament involving 20 teams. Thus, each team plays
38 games, facing each time one of the other 19 teams (once home, another away). The 20
teams, and the overall audience (in millions) of each team during the last completed season
(2016-2017), are listed in the rst two columns of Table 1.20 The last two columns contain the
actual revenues they made (in millions of euros and in percentage terms).21
Insert Table 1 about here
As we can see, two teams dominated the sharing collecting a combined 22:9% of the pie.
Note that the total audience of the complete season is 178; 5 millions, whereas the total
revenue made was 1246; 9 millions of euros. Thus, in order to accommodate the premises of our
model and identify total audience with total revenue, we have to assume that each viewer paid
a pay-per-view fee of 7 euros (instead of only one) per game. This normalizing assumption,
and the resulting scaling, will be implicit in the next tables describing the allocations.
Table 2 lists the allocations proposed by our two rules (equal-split and concede-and-divide),
with the normalizing assumption mentioned above. They also appear in percentage levels.
Insert Table 2 about here
Several conclusions can be derived from Table 2. Maybe the most obvious one is that,
contrary to what some might argue, the actual revenue sharing seems to be biased against the
two powerhouses. More precisely, although the equal-split rule would recommend a somewhat
19http://www.laliga.es/en
20The source for most of the data provided here is Palco 23, the leading newspaper in economic information of
the sport business in Spain. Palco 23 refers itself to Havas Sports and Entertainment as its source. See, for in-
stance, https://www.palco23.com/marketing/la-lucha-por-la-audiencia-que-clubes-se-siguieron-mas-en-tv.html.
These data are also conrmed by a report published in Marca, the leading Spanish newspaper in terms of
daily readers, on the rst fth of the season. See, for instance, http://www.marca.com/futbol/laboratorio-
datos/2017/05/22/5922fd72468aeb984e8b4612.html
21The source is La Ligas website. See, for instance, http://www.laliga.es/lfp/reparto-ingresos-audiovisuales
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similar aggregated allocation for them (close to one fourth of the pie), concede-and-divide would
recommend for them almost two fths of the pie. More precisely, Real Madrid would be
obtaining 12:2% with the equal-split rule and 20:2% with concede-and-divide. Barcelona would
also go up considerably with concede-and-divide (from 11:7% to 18:1%), although it would go
down with the equal-split rule (from 11:7% to 11:2%).
Another conclusion is that eight teams (Alavés, Athletic, Celta, Leganés, Osasuna, Sporting,
Valencia and Villareal) are favored by the actual allocation, in the sense that the amount
they get is above the amounts suggested by the two rules. Seven teams (Atlético de Madrid,
Barcelona, Deportivo, Eibar, Español, Granada and Malaga) obtain amounts between those
suggested by the two rules. Finally, beyond Real Madrid, there are four teams (Betis, Las
Palmas, Real Sociedad and Sevilla) that obtain amounts below those suggested by the two
rules. The case of Betis is remarkable, as the allocation yields 3:9%, whereas the two rules
would recommend 5:8% and 6:6%, respectively.
It has been argued that an extremely unequal sharing of the broadcasting revenues would
be detrimental for the overall quality of the tournament. Some even go further claiming that
a system with unequal shares of revenue, widening the gap between clubs, might violate EU
competition law.22 Clubs with higher earnings will be able to attract more playing talent.
Eventually, this will make them prevail (overwhelmingly) in their national tournaments, winning
easily most of the games. Likewise, teams with lower earnings will become less competitive,
eventually giving up while playing against the richest teams (preserving their key players for
the ensuing more balanced games against other peer teams). This will render most of the games
in the tournament uninteresting (even for the fan base of the rich teams). Because of this, one
might argue that a sharing process based on performance might not be that di¤erent from a
sharing process based on audiences. This statement can be rejected with the data presented
above. For instance, Betis appears fourth in audience gures, whereas it ended fteenth in the
league standings; Las Palmas appears seventh in audience gures, whereas it ended fourteenth
in the league standings; Villareal appears tenth in audience gures, whereas it ended fth in
22In late 2014, the so-called FASFE (an organization consisting of groups of fans, club members, and minority
shareholders of several Spanish professional football clubs) and the International Soccer Centre (a movement
that aims to obtain more balanced and transparent football and basketball competitions in Spain) led an
antitrust complaint with the European Commission against the Spanish National Professional Football League.
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the league standings; Alavés appears last in audience gures, whereas it ended ninth in the
league standings;
Criteria !
Country
Egalitarian
League performance:
Scoring, ...
Social performance:
TV audience, ...
England 50% 25% 25%
Germany 100%
Italy 40% 30% 30%
Spain (new) 50% 25% 25%
Table 3. Hybrid revenue sharing in the most important European football leagues.
To account for the above (at least, partially), we consider alternative schemes with our
database described above. More precisely, we present in what follows di¤erent mixed schemes
in which a portion of the overall revenue is equally divided, another is proportionally divided
according to scoring performance, and the residual is divided according to one of our two rules
(thus, only taking into account the audiences). Note that this is indeed what happens in the
most important European football leagues, as described in Table 3. La Liga itself implemented
a new scheme along those lines for the past season (2016-2017) in which, as shown by the table,
half of the overall revenue will be shared equally, whereas one quarter will be shared according
to league performance and the remaining quarter according to social performance.23
Table 4 summarizes the outcomes that our rules would yield when modied to endorse the
hybrid scheme implemented by La Liga. More precisely, we assume that half of the overall
revenue will be shared equally (that would represent 31.2 million euros for each team), whereas
one quarter will be shared according to league performance and the remaining quarter according
to social performance (where we apply our two rules). By league performance, La Liga refers to
the places at the end of the previous ve seasons (where a zero score is given to those teams that
played in the second division, or below, in one of those years). One quarter of the budget is then
allocated proportionally to those 5-year standings. By social performance, La Liga assigns one
third (of the corresponding one quarter) proportionally to the revenues generated from ticket
23The full details of this new scheme, which was actually sanctioned by the Spanish government, appeared in
the O¢ cial Bulletin of the Spanish State on May 1st, 2015. The numbers provided in Table 1 are supposed to
reect this scheme.
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sales in the last ve seasons.24 The other two thirds (of that one quarter) are supposed to be
assigned according to audiences. We will then consider our equal-split and concede-and-divide
rules for that portion of the budget. More precisely, the second and third columns of Table 4
are the result of aggregating (for each team) the xed amount (31.2 million), the proportional
amounts to league performance and ticket sales, and the amount suggested by each rule for the
division of the remaining one sixth of the budget.
Insert Table 4 about here
An obvious aspect that one can observe from Table 4 is that the hybrid schemes become
more egalitarian. More precisely, under the full-edged equal-split rule, the two powerhouses
were obtaining (combined) 23:4% of the pie. The hybrid scheme lowers this to 20:8%. Under the
full-edged concede-and-divide, the two powerhouses were obtaining (combined) 38:3%, which
now drastically moves down (under the hybrid scheme) to 23:3%.
Table 4 now shows that six teams (Barcelona, Granada, Leganés, Málaga, Osasuna and
Valencia) are favored by the actual allocation, in the sense that the amount they get is above
the amounts suggested by the two hybrid schemes. Eight teams (Alavés, Athletic, Atlético de
Madrid, Celta, Deportivo, Eibar, Sporting and Real Madrid) obtain amounts between those
suggested by the two rules. The remaining six teams (Betis, Español, Las Palmas, Real So-
ciedad, Sevilla and Villareal) obtain amounts below those suggested by the two hybrid schemes.
A nal aspect is that the two hybrid schemes produce much more similar allocations to the
existing one. In the case of the equal-split (hybrid) scheme only one team (Barcelona) varies
more than 1% with respect to the existing scheme, and the overall variance is 6:2%. In the
case of the concede-and-divide (hybrid) scheme, all teams vary less than 1% with respect to the
existing scheme (Real Sociedad is the one varying most, with 0:9%), and the overall variance
is 6:7%.
24For this, we consider data on season tickets for the last two seasons, which are the only ones available
(again, obtained from Palco 23). See, for instance, https://www.palco23.com/clubes/los-clubes-arrancan-la-liga-
santander-con-cerca-de-600-000-abonados.html and https://www.palco23.com/clubes/los-clubes-de-primera-y-
segunda-rozan-los-800000-abonados-en-2017-2018.html
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7 Discussion
We have presented a stylized model to deal with the problem of sharing the revenues from
broadcasting sport events. We have provided normative, empirical and game-theoretical foun-
dations for rules sharing each games revenues equally or proportionally among the participating
teams. Both rules have distinguishing merits. One (concede-and-divide) is supported by an
intuitive procedure aiming to reect the (potentially di¤erent) fan base of each team. Another
(the equal-split rule) is supported by a powerful (and normatively appealing) stability property
preventing secessions from participating players.
We have also provided as a case study an empirical application deriving what both rules
would suggest for the Spanish Football League (La Liga). Hybrid schemes in which our rules are
only used to share one sixth of the budget, whereas the remaining budget is allocated according
to the criteria of La Liga, yield close outcomes to the current allocation being implemented by
the Spanish National Professional Football League.
It is left for further research to enrich the model in plausible ways. For instance, some games
are o¤ered for free (in non-subscription channels), instead of pay per view. That might inuence
the audience numbers. In our case study (La Liga), not all teams are broadcasted under that
option. And the broadcasting rights for those games are negotiated independently. Thus,
it might well make sense to talk about two di¤erent budgets: one coming from subscription
channels (to which all teams have access) and another coming from non-subscription channels
(to which not all teams have access, and which might be associated to di¤erent audience gures).
Similarly, several games might be broadcasted simultaneously, which might reduce the num-
ber of viewers for some games. And if all games are broadcasted in exclusive time windows
(as it happens, for instance, in our case study), prime time is only awarded to some games.
All these aspects, which have been ignored in our model, might have an important impact on
audience gures.
Finally, we could also consider other forms of tournaments. For instance, an elimination
(as opposed to a round robin) tournament divided into successive rounds in which, as rounds
progress, the number of competitors decreases. This is a popular form in international com-
petitions (e.g., Football World Cups) and its analysis would require a di¤erent model, able to
include concepts from graph theory.25
25For instance, the teams competing in the round of 16 at the UEFA Champions League, will increase their
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Appendix that is not part of the submission for publication
To save space, we have included in this appendix, which is not for publication a more
detailed axiomatic analysis of the two rules considered in this paper.
8 Appendix
We rst provide a list of axioms and study which ones are satised by each rule. Then, we
characterize both rules using some of them.
The rst axiom we consider says that if two teams have the same audiences, then they
should receive the same amount.
Equal treatment of equals: For each (N;A) 2 P, and each pair i; j 2 N such that
aik = ajk, and aki = akj, for each k 2 N n fi; jg,
Ri(N;A) = Rj(N;A):
The second axiom says that revenues should be additive on A. Formally,
Additivity: For each pair (N;A) and (N;A0) 2 P
R (N;A+ A0) = R (N;A) +R (N;A0) :
The third axiom says that if nobody watches a single game of a given team (i.e., the team
has a null audience), then such a team gets no revenue.
Null team: For each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N , such that aij = 0 = aji, for each j 2 N ,
Ri(N;A) = 0:
Alternatively, the next axiom says that if a team nullies the audience of all the games it
plays (for instance, due to some kind of boycott), then the allocation of such a team should
decrease exactly by the total audience of such a team.26 Formally,
26A similar axiom was introduced in cooperative transferable utility games by van den Brink (2007).
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Nullifying team: For each (N;A); (N;A0) 2 P such that there exists k 2 N (the nullifying
team) satisfying a0ij = aij when k =2 fi; jg and a0ij = 0 when k 2 fi; jg we have that
Rk(N;A
0) = Rk(N;A)  k(A):
The next axiom says that the allocation should be in the core of the game vA, described in
Section 3.
Core selection: For each (N;A) 2 P,
R(N;A) 2 C (N; vA) :
The next axiom says that no team should receive negative awards.
Non negativity. For each (N;A) 2 P and i 2 N;
Ri (N;A)  0:
The next axiom says that if the audience of team i is, game by game, not smaller than the
audience of team j, then team i could not receive less than team j.
Monotonicity: For each (N;A) 2 P and each pair i; j 2 N , such that, for each k 2
Nn fi; jg, aik  ajk and aki  akj we have that
Ri(N;A)  Rj (N;A) :
The next axiom says that each team should receive, at most, the total audience of the games
played by the team.
Maximum aspirations: For each (N;A) 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri(N;A)  i(N;A):
The next axiom refers to the incremental e¤ect of adding a single additional viewer to a
game. It states that the additional revenue should be shared equally among the involved teams
in such a game. Formally,
Equal sharing of additional viewers: For each pair (N;A); (N; A^) 2 P such that aij =
a^ij, for each pair (i; j) 6= (i0; j0), and ai0;j0 + 1 = a^i0;j0,
Ri0(N; A^) Ri0(N;A) = Rj0(N; A^) Rj0(N;A):
We now study which axioms are satised by each rule.
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Proposition 3 The equal-split rule satises equal treatment of equals, additivity, null team,
monotonicity, core selection, non negativity, maximum aspirations, and equal sharing of addi-
tional viewers, but violates nullifying team.
Proof. It is trivial to show that S satises equal treatment of equals, null team, monotonicity,
non negativity, and maximum aspirations. We have already seen that S satises core selection.
Additivity is a consequence of the fact that, for each pair (N;A); (N;A0) 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
i (N;A+ A
0) = i (N;A) + i (N;A0) . Similarly, equal sharing of additional viewers is a
consequence of the fact that i(N; A^) = i(N;A) + 1 when i 2 fi0; j0g.
As for nullifying team, let (N;A) be such that N = f1; 2; 3g and aij = 10 for each pair
i; j 2 N; i 6= j. Let (N;A0) be obtained from A by nullifying team 3: Namely, a012 = a021 = 10
and a0ij = 0 otherwise. Then  (N;A) = (40; 40; 40) and  (N;A
0) = (20; 20; 0). Hence,
ES (N;A) = (20; 20; 20) and ES (N;A0) = (10; 10; 0), which shows that S does not satisfy
nullifying team, as S3 (N;A0) = 0 6=  20 = S3 (N;A)  3 (A).
Proposition 4 Concede-and-divide satises equal treatment of equals, additivity, nullifying
team, monotonicity, maximum aspirations, and equal sharing of additional viewers, but violates
null team, core selection and non negativity.
Proof. It is trivial to show that CD satises equal treatment of equals, monotonicity and maxi-
mum aspirations. Additivity is a consequence of the fact that, for each pair (N;A); (N;A0) 2 P,
and each i 2 N , jjA+ A0jj = jjAjj+ jjA0jj and i (N;A+ A0) = i (N;A) + i (N;A0).
Let (N;A); (N;A0) 2 P and k 2 N be as in the denition of nullifying team. Then,
CDk (N;A
0) = k (N;A0) 
P
j;k2Nnfig
 
a0jk + a
0
kj

n  2
=  
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk + akj)
n  2
= k (N;A) 
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk + akj)
n  2   k (N;A)
= CDk (N;A)  k (N;A) :
Then, CD satises nullifying team.
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Let (N;A) ;

N; A^

2 P and (i0; j0) as in the denition of equal sharing of additional
viewers. As
A^ = jjAjj+1 and i N; A^ = i (N;A)+ 1 when i 2 fi0; j0g, we have that, for
each i 2 fi0; j0g,
Ri

N; A^

 Ri (N;A) =
(n  1)i

N; A^

 
A^
n  2  
(n  1)i (N;A)  jjAjj
n  2
=
(n  1) [i (N;A) + 1]  [jjAjj+ 1]
n  2  
(n  1)i (N;A)  jjAjj
n  2
= 1:
Then, CD satises equal sharing of additional viewers.
As for the remaining axioms, let (N;A) 2 P be such that N = f1; 2; 3g, a12 = a21 = 10
and aij = 0 otherwise. Then, jjAjj = 20 and  = (20; 20; 0). Hence CD (N;A) = (20; 20; 20).
From here, it follows that CD does not satisfy null team, because a3i = ai3 = 0, for each
i 2 N , but CD3 (N; a) =  20 6= 0: Similarly, CD does not satisfy non negativity because
CD3 (N; a) =  20 < 0, and core selection because CD3 (N;A) =  20 < 0 = vA (3).
We have seen that CD could provide negative awards. This fact is not counterintuitive at all
in the maximalist scenario for the fan e¤ect. Consider, for instance, a league with three teams
where team 1 has 600 followers, team 2 has also 600, and team 3 has not followers. Besides,
no follower of team 1 and 2 wants to watch the games of team 3. This situation induces a
problem where a12 = a21 = 1200 and aij = 0 otherwise. Under this assumption, team 1 should
receive 2400 because it plays four games in the league and with a contribution of 600 fans to
each game. The same happens with team 2. Nevertheless, the contribution of team 3 to the
league is negative because it has no fans and, moreover, the other teamsfans do not want to
watch the games of team 3.
Theorem 4 The following statements hold:
(a) A rule satises equal treatment of equals, additivity and null team if and only if it is the
equal-split rule.
(b) A rule satises equal sharing of additional viewers, additivity and null team if and only
if it is the equal-split rule.
(c) A rule satises equal treatment of equals and nullifying team if and only if it is concede-
and-divide.
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Proof. (a) By Proposition 3, the equal-split rule satises the three axioms in the statement.
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying them. Let (N;A) 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N , with i 6= j,
let Aij denote the matrix with the following entries:
aijkl =
8<: aij if (k; l) = (i; j)0 otherwise.
Notice that aijji = 0:
Let k 2 N: By additivity,
Rk (N;A) =
X
i;j2N :i6=j
Rk
 
N;Aij

:
By null team, for each pair i; j 2 N with i 6= j, and for each l 2 Nn fi; jg, we have
Rl (N;A
ij) = 0. Thus,
Rk (N;A) =
X
l2Nnfkg

Rk
 
N;Alk

+Rk
 
N;Akl

:
By equal treatment of equals, Rk
 
N;Alk

= Rl
 
N;Alk

: As
Alk = alk, we have that
Rk
 
N;Alk

= alk
2
: Similarly, Rk
 
N;Akl

= akl
2
: Thus,
Rk (N;A) =
X
l2Nnfkg
halk
2
+
akl
2
i
=
k
2
= Sk (N;A) :
(b) By Proposition 3, the equal-split rule satises the three axioms in the statement. Con-
versely, let R be a rule satisfying them. Let (N;A) 2 P and k 2 N: As in the proof of (a), it
follows, by additivity and null team, that
Rk (N;A) =
X
l2Nnfkg

Rk
 
N;Alk

+Rk
 
N;Akl

:
Let 0N;N be the matrix with the same dimension of A and all entries equal to 0: By null
team, Rj (N; 0N;N) = 0, for each j 2 N . By equal sharing of additional viewers,
Rk
 
N;Alk

= Rk
 
N;Alk
 Rk (N; 0N;N)
= Rl
 
N;Alk
 Rl (N; 0N;N)
= Rl
 
N;Alk

:
From here, an analogous argument to that in the proof of (a) allows to deduce too that
R (N;A) = ES (N;A) :
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(c) By Proposition 4, concede-and-divide satises both axioms. Conversely, let R be a rule
satisfying the two axioms in the statement. Let (N;A) 2 P. Let t (A) be the number of null
teams in (N;A) : We proceed recursively on t (A) : Notice that t (A) 2 f0; 1; :::; n  2; ng :
Suppose rst that t (A) = n. Then, A = 0N;N (the matrix with all entries equal to 0): By
equal treatment of equals, for each i 2 N;
Ri (N; 0N;N) = 0 = CDi (N; 0N;N) :
Suppose now that t (A) = n   2. Then, A = Aij + Aji for some i; j 2 N and, therefore,
i (N;A) = j (N;A) = aij + aji, whereas k (N;A) = 0 for each k 2 N n fi; jg. Then,
CDk (N;A) =
8<: aij + aji if k 2 fi; jg (aij+aji)
n 2 otherwise.
As (N;A), (N; 0N;N) ; and k = i are under the hypothesis of nullifying team,
0 = Ri (N; 0N;N) = Ri (N;A)  (aij + aji) :
Thus, Ri (N;A) = aij + aji: Analogously, we can prove that Rj (N;A) = aij + aji:
By equal treatment of equals, we have that Rk (N;Aij) = Rl (N;Aij), for each pair k; l 2
Nn fi; jg. Let x denote such an amount. Then,
aij + aji = jjAjj =
X
k2N
Rk (N;A) = 2 (aij + aji) + (n  2)x;
from where it follows that x =  (aij+aji)
n 2 .
Thus, R (N;A) = CD (N;A), in this case too.
Assume now that R coincides with CD in problems with r null players. We prove that both
rules also coincide when we have r   1 null players.
Let (N;A) 2 P be a problem with r   1 null players. Let k be a no null player in (N;A) :
Let
 
N;A k

be the problem obtained from A by nullifying team k. Namely a kij = aij when
k =2 fi; jg and a kij = 0 when k 2 fi; jg : As A and A k are under the hypothesis on the axiom
of nullifying team, we deduce that
Rk (N;A) = Rk
 
N;A k

+ k (N;A) and CDk (N;A) = CDk
 
N;A k

+ k (N;A) :
As k is a null player in
 
N;A k

, and (N;A) has r   1 null players,  N;A k has r null
players. As R and CD coincide in problems with r null players, we have that Rk
 
N;A k

=
CDk
 
N;A k

: Thus, Rk (N;A) = CDk (N;A).
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Let us denote by D the set of null players in (N;A) : Then,X
i2D
Ri (N;A) = jjAjj  
X
i2NnD
Ri (N;A)
= jjAjj  
X
i2NnD
CDi (N;A)
=
X
i2D
CDi (N;A) :
As R and CD satisfy equal treatment of equals, all null teams in (N;A) must receive the
same according to both rules. Then, for each null player i in (N;A), we have that Ri (N;A) =
CDi (N;A) :
Remark 1 The axioms of Theorem 4 are independent.
Let R1 be the rule in which, for each game (i; j) 2 N N , the revenue goes to the team with
the lowest number of the two. Namely, for each problem (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N;
R1i (N;A) =
X
j2N :j>i
(aij + aji):
R1 satises null team and additivity, but not equal treatment of equals and equal sharing of
additional viewers.
The rule that divides the total audience equally among the teams satises equal treatment of
equals, equal sharing of additional viewers and additivity, but not null team.
Let R2 be the rule that, for each pair i; j 2 N , divides the audience aij between teams i and
j proportionally to their audiences in the games played agains the other teams.27 Namely, for
each problem (N;A) 2 P, and i 2 N;
R2i (N;A) =
X
j2Nnfig
P
k2Nnfi;jg
(aik + aki)P
k2Nnfi;jg
(aik + aki) +
P
k2Nnfi;jg
(ajk + akj)
[aij + aji] :
R2 satises equal treatment of equals, equal sharing of additional viewers, and null team, but
not additivity.
The equal-split rule satises equal treatment of equals but fails nullifying team.
Finally, we dene the rule R3 such that, for each problem (N;Aij) 2 P, and k 2 N;
R3k
 
N;Aij

=
8>>><>>>:
aij if k 2 fi; jg
 aij if k = min fl : l 2 Nn fi; jgg
0 otherwise
27If such other audiences are both 0, we divide equally.
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We extend R3 to all problems using additivity. Namely, R3 (N;A) =
P
i;j2N :i6=j
R3 (N;Aij) :
R3satises nullifying team but fails equal treatment of equals.
Table 5 below summarizes the performance of both rules with respect to the axioms intro-
duced in this section. The combination of the axioms with an asterisk in their cells characterizes
the rule. The same happens for the plus symbol.
Properties equal-split Concede-and-Divide
Equal treatment of equals YES* YES*
Additivity YES*+ YES
Null team YES*+ NO
Nullifying team NO YES*
Core selection YES NO
Non negativity YES NO
Monotonicity YES YES
Maximum aspirations YES YES
Equal sharing of additional viewers YES+ YES
Table 5: Axiomatic Analysis.
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